The Principle of Analogy by Bunting, Harry
The Principle of Analogy. 
ABSTRACT. 
Sceptics question whether ‘distinctively human’ predicates such as 
‘just’, ‘loving’ and ‘powerful’ can intelligibly be attributed to a divine 
being. If not, then a vicious form of agnosticism seems to threaten 
orthodox theism. Especially if one assumes a broadly empiricist 
semantics the challenge, whether formulated in terms of a univocal or 
an equivocal understanding of predicates, seems to generate 
intractable philosophical problems. Aquinas’ theory of analogical 
predication, understood either in terms of ‘analogy duorum ad 
tertium’ or in terms of ‘analogy unus ad alterum’, is an influential 
response to this sceptical challenge. Difficulties in each 
understanding are explored and it is suggested that a more fruitful 
framework for understanding theistic language is to be found in late 
20th century nativism of Fodor and Quine.     
A familiar feature of Judaic - Christian thought and worship, indeed a 
feature of all theistic religions, is the belief that God possesses certain 
attributes. For example, he is wise, truthful, just and forgiving. 
Throughout the history of Christian thought, however,  such 
attributions have given rise to intellectual perplexities for believers 
and unbelievers alike; for how can the language of finite human 
beings adequately describe the attributes of a transcendent God? And 
if divine attributes cannot be known then a form of radical scepticism 
seems to threaten orthodox theism.  
The Principle of Analogy is a response to this problem. It is a 
philosophical device designed to clarify the meanings of predicates 
which are commonly attributed to God and to do so in such a way 
that it overcomes the scepticism concerning their meaningfulness 
which I have just described. In exploring the Principle I will first clarify 
the sceptical challenge and some of  the assumptions about meaning 
on which it rests; I will then explain and critically examine some of the 
ways in which the Principle has been formulated; finally, I will offer a 
brief critique of the philosophical assumptions which underlie the 
Principle indicating how an alternative approach might overcome 
some of the difficulties which have been addressed.  
1. The sceptical challenge.  
      The sceptical challenge argues that terms can used meaningfully 
to refer to God only when certain semantic and theological 
background conditions are satisfied. It goes on to argue that theistic 
terms fail to satisfy the relevant background conditions and concludes 
that the terms familiarly used to refer to God are meaningless. The 
challenge runs as follows.  
      Consider some of the the terms with which, as I have said, we 
typically refer to God: He is loving, just, wise and forgiving. Let us 
suppose that we accept what might be called ‘the Empiricist Principle’ 
to the effect that the meanings of such ‘essentially human terms’ are 
learned in empirical contexts; I learn what wisdom is by contrasting 
the people that I know who possess it with those I know who do not 
possess it; I learn what love is by contrasting behaviour which is 
loving with behaviour which is less loving and so on. Let us accept, 
also, the logical truth that the property terms in question, when 
applied to God,  either preserve or do not preserve the meanings 
which they have in everyday human contexts; in the former case the 
meanings are said to be ‘univocal’, in the latter they are said to be 
‘equivocal’. Now to suppose the meanings to be univocal renders an 
understanding of their meaning unproblematical; divine love is 
continuous with (though greater than) human love, divine wisdom is 
continuous with (though greater than) human wisdom and so on. 
Hence if we know the meanings of the terms in human contexts we 
can know them, by extension, in divine contexts. However, attractive 
though it first appears, some consider this account to be 
unacceptable: theologians have argued that it compromises divine 
‘otherness’ or transcendence, it confuses the finite with the infinite, 
and it leaves us with a wholly ‘anthropomorphic’ conception of God.  
These convictions form the first horn of the dilemma.  The alternative 
assumption, that property terms referring to God are to be understood 
in an equivocal sense, also generates problems. If we only know the 
meanings of terms in empirical contexts and so can know nothing of 
their meaning in transcendent contexts, then since God is a 
transcendent being the properties cannot intelligibly be attributed to 
Him. And what then can we meaningfully say about God?  The terms 
which we familiarly use of God have been emptied of all intelligible 
content and we are left with a conception of God which is so 
attenuated that we are in danger of lapsing into scepticism concerning 
the divine nature. This is the second horn of the dilemma. That these 
alternatives appear exhaustive and that each is unacceptable is the 
problem to which the Principle of Analogy is offered as a solution.  
The problem just described has consistently engaged the Christian 
Church over the centuries. Seeds of a theory of analogical predication 
are to be found in the writings of the Patristic period.  Augustine is 
influenced by it when, in De Trinitate, he illustrates the mysteries of 
the Triune Being by drawing attention to analogous mysteries 
surrounding human psychology and in the late medieval period a  
rigorous examination of the issues was undertaken, especially by 
Aquinas and Suarez. In the early modern period sceptical doubts still 
lingered:  Archbishop King, for example, argued that our conceptions 
of God’s nature are as different from true knowledge of God as is a 
map from the land which it represents; Bishop Browne maintained 
that since our knowledge of God is composed of worldly ideas we have 
no more notion of divine things ‘than a blind man hath of light.’ The 
neo-Kantian framework of phenomenal and noumenal worlds revived 
similar agnostic worries and even in the closing decades of the 
twentieth century the issue engaged theists such H.L. Mansel as well 
as sceptics such as A.G.N. Flew.  
Responses to the sceptical argument either accept the basic 
philosophical framework which I have just described or they challenge 
it. The latter possibility should be noted because the Empiricist 
Principle has been rejected in this century by philosophers such as 
Chomsky, Fodor, Quine and Wittgenstein,  a point to which I will 
return in the conclusion.  
More commonly, theists have accepted the sceptic’s underlying 
empiricist assumptions and, as a consequence, have been led to 
accept some form of the theory of analogy which forms the subject 
matter of this article.  The principle of analogy is an important and 
influential response and it is to it, especially to its classical expression 
in the Scholastic period, that we must now turn.  
2. The Principle of Analogy.  
When Aquinas looked for a theory of the divine attributes he drew 
upon the philosophical traditions of the Greeks, especially upon the 
ideas of Aristotle whose works were at that time becoming available in 
the universities of Paris, Oxford and Bologna. Here he found both the 
basic philosophical assumptions and the detailed categories of 
thought within which the theory of analogical predication was 
formulated. Prominent in the former were, firstly, Aristotle’s theory of  
concepts, especially his distinction between equivocal and univocal 
terms and his account of the different kinds of equivocation; and 
secondly, his account of the different senses of being, in particular his 
stress that the different senses of being may be unified by their 
relationship to one fundamental sense. Even more important to the 
needs of the Schoolmen was Aristotle’s account of how we acquire 
knowledge of attributes. According to this view we have no direct 
knowledge of Forms such as wisdom, love or justice; rather we come 
to know these things only indirectly by experiencing the imperfect 
embodiments of them in particular persons and actions.   
The theory of analogy drew on these basic Aristotelian categories so as 
to explain how, granted our finite understanding, we can have 
knowledge of the infinite divine character. In so doing Aquinas 
distinguished, first, between the two forms that analogy may take, 
‘duorum ad tertium’  and ‘unius ad alterum’ and then  distinguished 
between two sub-divisions of the latter, namely the analogy of 
attribution and the analogy of proportionality.  As we shall see, each 
of these elements played an influential role in the development of the 
theory of analogy and it is to and exposition and criticism of these 
theories that we must now turn.  
‘Analogy duorum ad tertium'.  This form of analogy links two 
analogates, or bearers of properties, by virtue of their relationship to a 
third analogate in which the property which is the basis for the 
resemblance is paradigmatically displayed. Suppose then, that 
analogates Ai, Aii and Aiii all exhibit, non-univocally, a property P. An 
analogy duorum ad tertium  obtains between P as exhibited in Ai and 
Aii if and only if the following conditions are satisfied: Ai resembles 
Aii; Ai and Aii both resemble Aiii; the property P is displayed 
paradigmatically in Aiii so that, in Scholastic terms, Aiii is the ‘prime 
analogate’ or Form of the property in question; finally, it is by virtue of 
the presence of P in Aiii that Ai resembles Aii.  
Consider the property of being healthy. Fresh fruit is a healthy form of 
food, walking is a healthy form of exercise and Jones is a healthy 
person. The health that Jones enjoys is the prime analogate; fresh 
fruit and walking are healthy by analogy in the sense that they enjoy 
similar relationships to the prime analogate.  
In our present context, humans and God are analogates which 
resemble each other by virtue of their relation to another analogate, 
which is the Form of the property in respect of which God and 
humans are alike.  
‘Analogy duorum ad tertium' is rarely invoked as an account of divine 
attributes. Recall the problem with which the principle of analogy is 
centrally concerned: the meanings of all human property terms are 
derived from empirical contexts (‘The Empirical Principle’) and we 
wonder if they can be meaningfully applied beyond those contexts. 
The problem is that if The Empirical Principle is accepted then the 
meaning of prime analogates is as inaccessible as the meanings of the 
terms which describe divine attributes.  We may state the problem in 
the form of a dilemma: either we accept The Empirical Principle or we 
do not accept it. If we accept the principle then we can never know the 
meaning of prime analogates because, as Forms, by reference to 
which attributes are ascribed both to God and to human beings, their 
meanings necessarily go beyond these contexts. On the other hand, if 
we reject The Empirical Principle and assert that meanings can 
transcend human experience then the meanings of prime analogates 
are, in principle, accessible. However, if that is the case then the 
whole theory of ‘analogy duorum ad tertium'  loses its rationale. If 
human empirical contexts can, after all, be transcended and we have 
direct access to the meanings of prime analogates, then there is no 
reason, in principle, why we should not have direct knowledge of the 
meaning of terms that refer to divine attributes. ‘Analogy duorum ad 
tertium' is redundant.  
If the scholastic principle of analogy is to be plausible, therefore, we 
must turn to the form that it took in ‘analogy unus ad alterum'. This 
type of analogy postulates only a non-univocal relationship between 
two analogates, no third independent analogate is involved. In its 
turn, however, it subdivides into the analogy of attribution and the 
analogy of proportionality and it is to these forms that we must now 
look for a more coherent account of the theory.            
The analogy of attribution.  The most important feature of this form of 
analogy is that the attribute properly belongs to one of the two 
analogates, the prime analogate, and only relatively or derivatively to 
the other analogate. Some technical terms will require elucidation, 
however, in the process of expounding this conception.  
Firstly, consider primacy. It is tempting to think that the primacy in 
question is ontological and that since all perfections are most fully 
realised in the divine nature, the prime analogate is God.  In the 
present context, however, this would be a mistake. We are interested 
in the extent to which terms whose meaning is learned in human 
experience can,  if at all, be applied to God and, by implication, 
whether we can ever know the meaning of such terms when applied to 
God. Consequently the primacy is question is semantic and 
epistemological, not ontological and it is the meaning of terms in 
finite, empirical contexts that is primary and their application to God 
that is derivative.  
Secondly, when we speak of  derivative attributions the relationship is 
usually thought of as being causal, the derivative attribution being 
causally effective in relation to the primary analogate. To take the 
standard example, fresh fruit is healthy because eating it is causally 
linked to the health of the healthy person. In the theistic context, 
therefore,  a divine attribute is whatever is causally necessary to bring 
about the attribute which is properly displayed in the prime 
analogate, namely human beings. Thus when we say that God and  
humans are both good we are, so far as analogy of attribution is 
concerned, saying no more than that God has goodness to the degree 
and in the form that are causally effective in producing human 
goodness.  
   This having been made clear, the difficulty with the analogy of 
attribution is evident. We wish to know in what ways divine attributes 
resemble human attributes and the answer is this: the analogates 
apply non-univocally to both God and humans and God’s attributes 
are causally sufficient in relation to human attributes. But this does 
not enable us to say whether, in what respect or to what degree divine 
attributes are like human attributes.  
Our agnostic and sceptical doubts are not relieved by the analogy of 
attribution; we must either find a more plausible rendering of primacy 
or reformulate the theory without any conception of primacy. It is the 
latter alternative which we will now explore.   
The analogy of proportionality.  In this, as in the previous case, the 
principle of analogy involves a common attribute ascribed, non-
univocally, to two analogates. In the case of proportionality, however, 
the relationship is not hierarchical: neither of the analogates is 
primary. The attribute is found formally in both analogates but the 
mode of their presence is determined by the nature of the bearer.  
There is not then, a literal equivalence between wisdom or love or 
justice as found in God and in humans. Both possess the attributes 
but the essential nature of the bearer determines the form of the 
attribute that each possesses. As A.M.Farrer explains, ‘Divine 
intelligence is appropriate to divine existence as creaturely  to 
creaturely.’ 
In summary, in the analogy of proportionality an attribute is 
exemplified in each of two analogates in the form that is appropriate 
to each analogate and quite independently of any relation to a prime 
analogate.  
This conception of analogy has its origins in Greek mathematics in 
which it referred to the proportionality, that is to the common or 
reciprocal relations (eg. double, triple etc.), which exist between  two 
proportions. However, it was best known in the context of direct 
comparisons between terms with similar meanings and resemblances 
between relations. Thus:  
divine wisdom   =   human wisdom  ,   divine  love      =  human love       
divine nature          human nature       divine nature      human 
nature          
This conception of analogy has much to commend it. On the one 
hand, it seems to justice to the sense of divine ‘otherness’, to the 
sense that God’s attributes differ in kind as well as in degree, from 
human attributes; and so it is not open to the charge of 
anthropomorphism to which some accounts seem vulnerable.  Yet, on 
the other hand, it does seem to recognise a continuity between divine 
attributes and human attributes, thus avoiding the threat of 
scepticism.   
The difficulty with the analogy of proportionality is not so much that 
what it asserts is false: how, for example, could one fault the 
contention that God’s attributes are appropriate to His divine nature? 
The problem is more that the theory does not say enough and that 
what it says does not show how agnostic doubts about the nature of 
divine attributes can be answered. The theory attempts to throw light 
on the divine attributes by drawing attention to the fact that the 
relationship between God’s attributes and God’s nature is the same as 
the relationship between human attributes and human nature. Since 
we know the latter relationship, it is assumed that we can move to the 
former; and that we can move from knowledge of the former to 
knowledge of the nature of God’s attributes. However, we do not come 
to know human attributes by grasping their relationship with some 
conception of human nature. Rather, we have direct non-analogical 
knowledge of human attributes. That being the case, the problem in 
connection with divine attributes is that on the present theory we do 
not possess a knowledge of the divine nature which enables us to 
qualify the relevant attribute, nor do we know what the appropriate 
qualification would be. In place of a theory there is merely the promise 
of one.  
Consider a specific example. We are told that human love is relative to 
human nature. But how does that differ from merely saying that there 
are certain characteristic ways in which human beings show their 
love? And, correspondingly,  it is not clear how the view that divine 
love is relative to the divine nature differs from merely saying that 
divine love manifests itself in various characteristic forms. The 
analogy of proportion seems to take us no closer to a knowledge of the 
nature of the divine attributes.  
3. Conclusion.  
If an intermediate position between univocal and equivocal accounts 
of divine attribute terms cannot be found then Christian philosophers 
might be expected to explore radical alternatives which would 
challenge the framework within which the basic problem arose. One 
such radical alternative, to which I alluded briefly, at the end of 
section 1, would be to challenge the Empirical Principle and it is to 
this suggestion that I now return. There are both  philosophical and 
theological strands to such an alternative.  
Firstly, at a philosophical level we should note the precarious status 
in contemporary philosophy of the Empiricist Principle itself. The 
Empiricist Principle (the meaning of all property terms is derived from 
experience) is not self-evidently true, so on what grounds is it 
asserted? It has been challenged from many philosophical quarters in 
recent decades. Chomsky has argued that one cannot explain the 
acquisition of basic linguistic structures without postulating innate 
cognitive capacities and Fodor has extended this thesis to the 
acquisition of all concepts. More generally, Quine and Wittgenstein 
have mounted sustained attacks on the empiricist conceptions of 
concept formation. If we follow Quine in replacing the ‘two dogmas of 
empiricism’ by a form of holism, constrained by simplicity, 
consistency and epistemic conservatism we would have an alternative 
framework for defending human knowledge of divine attributes.  The 
alternative to empiricism would be a nativism which held that our 
knowledge of meanings is a function of our innate cognitive structures 
together with experience which shapes and informs those innate 
structures.     
Secondly, at a theological level, the account of human knowledge of 
divine attributes would form one part of the general belief that 
humans were created in the image of God. On such an account 
empiricist conceptions of concept formation  would be replaced by 
what I shall refer to as ‘strong theistic nativism.’ Nativism is the view 
that concept formation is, at least in part, a function of the structure 
of the cognitive capacities of the knowing subject. Theistic nativism is 
the view that  nativism is true and that human cognitive capacities 
are the result of God’s creative activity. Strong theistic nativism is the 
view that nativism is true and that God has created human cognitive 
capacities so that they can recognise and respond to God’s own 
character.  
Empiricist incomprehension concerning the divine attributes would be 
overcome on such a view. Acceptance of the Empiricist Principle made 
it seem strange, if not incomprehensible, that our finite cognitive 
structures could provide us with knowledge of the divine nature. 
However, on strong theistic nativism this is not in the least strange: 
humans have knowledge of the divine attributes precisely because 
God created them in such a fashion that they might know, love and 
serve Him.   
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